⏱ 4 min read
OFAC alleges BitBank processed ‘Hormuz Safe’ payments and helped move hundreds of millions of dollars in Bitcoin to the IRGC; designations name Pishtaz Simorgh and three Zanjani associates.
US authorities sanctioned Iranian crypto exchange BitBank, alleging it processed Bitcoin paid by ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz and helped route hundreds of millions of dollars in Bitcoin to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, according to the US Treasury’s OFAC.
The OFAC BitBank Designation
OFAC announced sanctions on BitBank, saying the platform processed Bitcoin tied to payments by vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control said that, as of June, the Hormuz Safe Marine Services Authority used BitBank to transfer payments it received to the IRGC. The designations also cover BitBank’s developer, Pishtaz Simorgh Electronic Trade Company, and three associates of Iranian financier Babak Zanjani. “Today’s designations of Iranian digital asset infrastructure make perfectly clear that efforts to finance the Iranian regime using cryptocurrencies are not beyond OFAC’s reach,” said US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Treasury cast the move as part of a broader effort to isolate Iran from the international financial system, including via sanctions on digital asset exchanges.
OFAC’s description alleges that BitBank is part of an architecture used by Babak Zanjani to move hundreds of millions of dollars in Bitcoin to the IRGC. The designation package explicitly names four components: BitBank, Pishtaz Simorgh Electronic Trade Company, and three associates of Zanjani — signaling a targeted network approach rather than a single-entity action. Treasury’s note that Hormuz Safe payments were routed via BitBank as of June anchors the alleged flow path to a concrete operational conduit. The designation lists BitBank as established in 2024. Separately, the input clarifies that Iran’s BitBank is distinct from Japan’s bitbank, inc, a fully licensed exchange founded in 2014 and acquired by SBI Holdings in June — a crucial distinction for screening.
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‘Hormuz Safe’ Maritime Scheme
First-order effects concentrate in compliance and access: sanctions on a digital asset exchange typically sever onshore fiat ramps and dissuade compliant service providers from facilitating transactions, tightening the liquidity perimeter around the named entities. When OFAC asserts a link between maritime payments and IRGC financing, exchanges, brokers, and OTC desks adjust counterparty risk models to reflect that exposure path. The inclusion of a developer entity and identified associates indicates OFAC’s intent to pressure operational and support layers as well as the front-end platform. In practice, that broadens the set of entities screened and increases the odds that intermediated services decline related flows.
OFAC’s framing that designations are within its reach for cryptocurrencies signals to risk officers that digital flows receive comparable scrutiny to fiat rails. The allegation of hundreds of millions of dollars in Bitcoin routed to the IRGC implies a scale that raises thresholds for enhanced due diligence across counterparties touching Iranian-origin digital asset activity. Without published wallet-level identifiers here, firms rely on entity-based controls and vendor list updates, which can lead to conservative over-blocking. That conservatism, while protective, can also push marginal activity further from compliant venues, fragmenting liquidity and complicating monitoring.
Pishtaz Simorgh and 3 Associates
- Update sanctions screening to include BitBank, Pishtaz Simorgh Electronic Trade Company, and three associates of Babak Zanjani immediately.
- Require enhanced due diligence for counterparties referencing “Hormuz Safe” payments or the Strait of Hormuz maritime insurance context.
- Monitor OFAC communications for any wallet-level identifiers that could sharpen controls beyond entity-name filtering.
- Validate vendor lists to distinguish Iran’s BitBank from Japan’s bitbank, inc to minimize false-positive disruptions.
Japan’s bitbank, inc Clarification
Two clarifiers sit as catalysts. First, any public response from BitBank to Cointelegraph’s outreach could detail operational posture or dispute OFAC’s assertions, informing counterparty risk adjustments. Second, additional Treasury communications specifying how “as of June” payments moved from Hormuz Safe through BitBank to the IRGC — particularly any identifiers or intermediaries — would refine screening logic and reduce collateral blocking. The distinction that Iran’s BitBank is a separate entity from bitbank, inc in Japan, which was founded in 2014 and acquired by SBI Holdings in June, remains central for KYC vendors and banks calibrating sanctions responses. Clearer delineation in third-party databases would mitigate brand confusion and prevent unnecessary service suspensions.
This content is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial advice.
🧠 HafidWatch Take
If OFAC disclosures reveal that the volume and routing of “Hormuz Safe” payments through BitBank were substantially less extensive or operated through different channels than described, then this framing is incorrect because it overstates the centrality of BitBank in the transfer architecture and misattributes the scale of Bitcoin flows to the Iranian IRGC financing network.
A comparable precedent occurred in 2019 when sanctions targeted a different regional crypto platform alleged to support illicit finance, but subsequent investigations showed far narrower transactional involvement than initially claimed, leading markets and compliance regimes to recalibrate risk models. This historical case underscores how early designation narratives can misrepresent actual operational significance, resulting in disproportionate compliance reactions and market distortions.
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